Georgia State University

ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University
ICEPP Working Papers

International Center for Public Policy

7-2021

The Fiscal Architecture of Subnational Governments in Federal
Nepal
Khim Lal Devkota
Georgia State University, devkotakl@gmail.com

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/icepp
Part of the Economics Commons

Recommended Citation
Devkota, Khim Lal, "The Fiscal Architecture of Subnational Governments in Federal Nepal" (2021). ICEPP
Working Papers. 104.
https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/icepp/104

This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the International Center for Public Policy at
ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. It has been accepted for inclusion in ICEPP Working Papers by an
authorized administrator of ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@gsu.edu.

International Center for Public Policy
Working Paper 21-12
July 2021

The Fiscal Architecture of Subnational
Governments in Federal Nepal
Khim Lal Devkota

International Center for Public Policy
Working Paper 21-12

The Fiscal Architecture of Subnational
Governments in Federal Nepal

Khim Lal Devkota
July
2021

International Center for Public Policy
Andrew Young School of Policy Studies
Georgia State University
Atlanta, Georgia 30303
United States of America
Phone: (404) 413-0235
Fax: (404) 651-4449
Email: paulbenson@gsu.edu
Website: http://icepp.gsu.edu/
Copyright 2021, the Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
No part of the material protected by this copyright notice may be reproduced or utilized
in any form or by any means without prior written permission from the copyright owner.

International Center for Public Policy
Andrew Young School of Policy Studies
The Andrew Young School of Policy Studies was established at Georgia State University with
the objective of promoting excellence in the design, implementation, and evaluation of public
policy. In addition to two academic departments (economics and public administration), the
Andrew Young School houses seven leading research centers and policy programs, including
the International Center for Public Policy.
The mission of the International Center for Public Policy (ICePP) at the Andrew Young School
of Policy Studies is to provide academic and professional training, applied research, and
technical assistance in support of sound public policy and sustainable economic growth in
developing and transitional economies.
ICePP is recognized worldwide for its efforts in support of economic and public policy reforms
through technical assistance and training around the world. This reputation has been built
serving a diverse client base, including the World Bank, the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), finance
ministries, government organizations, legislative bodies, and private sector institutions.
The success of ICePP reflects the breadth and depth of its in-house technical expertise. The
Andrew Young School's faculty are leading experts in economics and public policy and have
authored books, published in major academic and technical journals, and have extensive
experience in designing and implementing technical assistance and training programs.
Andrew Young School faculty have been active in policy reform in over 40 countries around
the world. Our technical assistance strategy is not merely to provide technical prescriptions for
policy reform, but to engage in a collaborative effort with host governments and donor
agencies to identify and analyze the issues at hand, arrive at policy solutions, and implement
reforms.
ICePP specializes in four broad policy areas:
 Fiscal policy (e.g., tax reforms, public expenditure reviews)
 Fiscal decentralization (e.g., reform, intergovernmental transfer systems, urban finance)
 Budgeting and fiscal management (e.g., local, performance-based, capital, and multiyear
budgeting)
 Economic analysis and revenue forecasting (e.g., micro-simulation, time series forecasting)
For more information about our technical assistance activities and training programs, please
visit our website at http://icepp.gsu.edu or contact us by email at paulbenson@gsu.edu.

The Fiscal Architecture of Subnational Governments in Federal Nepal
Khim Lal Devkota1
July 2021
Abstract

The formation of the three tiers of government represents a novel experiment in Nepal’s federal
journey since the adoption of the new constitution in 2015. State power in the former unitary
system, both rights and responsibilities, has been divided across federal, provincial and local
tiers of government, with a mix of exclusive and concurrent powers for each. In matters within
their jurisdiction, subnational governments can formulate laws on financial rights, set their own
budgets, make decisions, devise plans and policies, implement those plans, levy taxes, and
collect revenues. In the roughly three years since devolution went into effect, a few problems
and uncertainties have cropped up, particularly in the exercise of power. Subnational
governments complain that the center has not been very cooperative when it comes to the
formulation of laws, allocation of resources, transfer of the institutional set-up, etc. However,
there have been some achievements in the implementation of federalism. Institutional
structures have formed at the subnational government levels, they have begun staffing, and
their fiscal situations are gradually strengthening. Improvements have been made in almost
all areas, including social, human development, economic, infrastructure and administrative
sectors. A sense of positive competition has been created between different local and provincial
governments. However, a continuing point of tension in Nepal’s federal devolution is shape of
the fiscal architecture supporting the new rights and responsibilities of subnational
governments. The constitution provides many functional responsibilities to provinces but only

limited revenue rights. This structure conflicts with the “finance follows function” principle of
effective decentralization, suggesting that initiatives are needed to review the fiscal space of
the provincial level. The purpose of this paper is to analyze existing institutional structures and
details of subnational government finance (“fiscal architecture”) in Nepal, primarily at the
provincial level, and identify recommendations for improvement.

Keywords: Subnational governments, Fiscal architecture, Institutional set up, COVID-19
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1. Introduction
Nepal moved from a unitary system of governance to a federal system through a
constitution enacted in September 2015. This comprehensive reform created three tiers of
governments (also referred to as federal units): the federal government, seven provincial
governments, and 753 local governments. 1
The constitution clearly lays out the exclusive and concurrent functions of each tier of
governments in its Schedules 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9. There are 35 exclusive functions for the federal
government, 21 exclusive functions for provincial governments, 22 exclusive functions for local
governments, 25 concurrent functions for federal and provincial governments, and 15 concurrent
functions for all three levels of governments. Table 1 summarizes some of the exclusive and
concurrent rights assigned to different levels of governments (federal units).
Table 1. Exclusive and Concurrent Rights to Federal Units
Exclusive rights
Federal

Defense, central planning, currency, foreign
affairs, citizenship, passport, etc. (Schedule 5)

Provincial

Provincial police administration, provincial
civil service, higher education, provincial level
development activities such as electricity,
irrigation, roads, land management, etc.
(Schedule 6)

Local

Town Police, management of local services,
basic and secondary education, basic health,
local roads, drinking water, etc.(Schedule 8)

Concurrent rights
Federal & Provincial
Federal, Provincial & Local
Civil & criminal
procedure, supply &
Cooperatives, education,
distribution of
health, agriculture,
essential goods,
irrigation, mines, minerals,
population
disaster management,
management, social
environment, forest,
security, casino, etc.
personal events,
(Schedule 7)
archaeology, motor vehicle
permits, etc. (Schedule 9)

Source: Constitution of Nepal, as quoted by Devkota (2020).
Although many public functional responsibilities have been constitutionally devolved to

1 The constitution defines the local level as a rural municipality, an urban municipality, or a district
assembly (Art.56). In terms of exercising power, the role of district assembly is almost negligible. Its
responsibility is just to coordinate with other level of governments. It has no financial powers. Similarly, it
includes no 'consolidated fund.' Its administrative expenses are borne by the provincial and federal
governments. In terms of numbers, there are 77 district assemblies. In the pre-federalization period, the
role of district assembly was very influential. At that time, the district assembly was called the District
Development Committees (DDC) and worked between the central government. the Village Development
Committee (rural municipality), and the municipality.
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subnational (provincial and local) governments, revenue-raising powers are still highly
centralized, with the federal government continuing to collect more than 80 percent of all public
revenues. 2 Analysis of revenue assignments reveals that the constitution assigns most revenueraising powers to the federal government. However, this does not mean that the federal government
uses all the revenue it raises. Part of this revenue goes to subnational governments through the
revenue sharing and fiscal transfer channels. The constitution also provides for a National Natural
Resources and Fiscal Commission (NNRFC), which guides the mechanisms of fiscal federalism,
including fiscal transfers. See Table 3 for the assignment of revenue-raising powers to the three
tiers of government in Nepal.
In terms of fiscal transfers, the provinces and local governments receive four types of
grants: fiscal equalization, conditional, special, and matching grants. Parallel to the grants from
the federal level, local governments also receive such grants from their provincial governments. 3
Both the federal government and provincial governments distribute fiscal equalization transfers to
lower-levels governments based on formulae and criteria recommended by the NNRFC. In
addition, the provincial and local tiers receive 15 percent each of fiscal resources collected across
the country from value-added taxes (VAT) and excise duties from domestic production under the
heading of “revenue sharing.” 4 As per the Intergovernmental Fiscal Arrangement Act 2017, the

In overall tax revenue collection, VAT makes the primary contribution at 30.88 percent, followed by
customs and other import duties (19.52 percent), income tax payable by enterprises and corporations
(15.47 percent), excise taxes (15.14 percent), and the use of goods and permission to use goods (3.52
percent). The cumulative share of these five taxes is around 85 percent. Per the Constitution, these five tax
headings were designated as exclusive revenue-raising powers of federal government. Further, the federal
government also retains a greater share from the non-tax headings as well (Devkota, 2017).
3 Provinces started providing fiscal transfers to local governments from their first full budget in FY 201819 and transferred about 10 percent of their total budgets to the local level in FY 2020-21. In general, the
provinces have established good practices in distributing grants to the local level from their own sources.
4 Out of total fiscal transfers to the subnational levels, this “revenue sharing” heading comprised 21.49
percent in FY 2018-19 (see Table 5). From this heading, the subnational levels can fund administrative
expenses, including the salary and allowance of officials.
2
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federal government keeps 70 percent and the remaining 30 percent is shared down to subnational
governments based on criteria related to population, geography, human development index, etc.
Similarly, the provincial and local governments get 25 percent each of royalties from natural
resources 5 collected from the respective subnational governments’ jurisdiction areas. The NNRFC
makes the criteria for the distribution of both “revenue sharing” and natural resources royalties.
The subnational governments can, in matters within their jurisdiction, formulate laws on
financial rights, set their own annual budgets, make decisions, devise plans and policies and
implement the above. They can also, likewise in matters within their jurisdiction, levy taxes and
collect revenue. 6 The resulting fiscal resources, institutional set-up, etc. are essential to carrying
out the tasks constitutionally assigned to the subnational governments. The main goals of this paper
are to briefly analyze existing institutional structures and details of the subnational government
finance and make recommendations for improvement.
The second section of this paper describes the demographic, geographic, human
development, and economic characteristics of the provincial governments (disaggregated data on
local governments is unavailable and so not included). The third section covers constitutional and
legal provisions regarding subnational governments including the pillars of revenue assignment,
such as the taxing powers, revenue sharing (including that from natural resources), fiscal transfers,
and borrowing. The fourth section briefly describes the fiscal situation of the federal government.
The institutional aspects of fiscal architecture are described in section five. The sixth section

In the constitution, royalties from natural resources are included in the concurrent list of all three levels
of government. As per the Inter-Governmental Fiscal Arrangement Act, 2017, provinces and local levels
each receive 25 percent of the royalties from the federal level collected from the use of natural resources,
such as mountaineering, forestry, electricity generation, mining, etc.
6 This is especially true for the exclusive functional areas. In Nepal, there is a kind of consensus among the
three tiers of government that it is possible to make laws on issues within an exclusive right. This
provision is also included in Article 59 of the Constitution. However, in practice, the federal government
has not allowed it to work well, instead interfering in the jurisdictions of subnational governments.
5

3

analyzes the finances of the subnational levels, focusing on the provinces. Section seven elaborates
the main issues and challenges, and the last section describes the way forward.
2. Brief Highlights of the Provincial Governments' Socioeconomic Indicators
The demographic, geographic, human development, and economic aspects of the provinces
are presented in Table 2. The table shows that Bagmati Province has the largest population, 21
percent of the national total. On the other end, Karnali Province has the smallest population, only
6 percent of the national total, despite having the largest geographical area (22 percent). In terms
of HDI and literacy rate, Bagmati Province has the highest ranks followed by Gandaki and
Province One. Province Two has the lowest position in both the HDI and literacy.
Table 2. Socioeconomic Details of Nepalese Provinces
Province Population Total area
in
in sq. km
thousands (a)
(a)

Count
of
Local
levels
(a)
25,905 (18) 137
9,661 (7) 136
20,300 (14) 119
22,585 (15) 85
17,318 (12) 109
31,873 (22) 79

One
4,535 (17)
Two
5,404 (20)
Bagmati 5,529 (21)
Gandaki 2,404 (9)
Five
4,499 (17)
Karnali
1,570 (6)
SudurPaschim 2,553 (10) 19,874 (13) 88
Nepal
26,495
1,47,516 753

Per
Percent HDI Literacy GDP in
Budget
capita in
Index rate (5 billions of in
Income Poverty Score years+), RS
billions
, USD (b)
percent (20-21) 7
of RS
(c)
(b)
(c)
(20-21) 8
919
19.7 0.58
71.22 612 (15.6)
40.9
645
47.9 0.51
49.54 519(13.3)
33.5
1917
12.2 0.661
74.85 1455(37.2)
51.4
1192
14.2 0.618
74.81 344(8.8)
34.8
803
29.9 0.563
66.43 550(14.0)
36.3
597
51.2 0.538
62.77
161(4.1)
33.7
683
1047

33.6 0.547
28.6 0.587

63.48
274(7.0)
65.94 3914(100)

33.3
1475

7 As per the Economic Survey of FY 2020-21 published by the Ministry of Finance (MOF, 2021a), the GDP
of Nepal has reached Rs. 3,914 billion.
8 In aggregated provincial budgets, the proportions of grants and revenue sharing comprise 38% and 23%,
respectively. Another 22% derived from the cash balance of previous fiscal year, i.e., unspent budget.
Further, own-source revenues and loans contributed 14% and 3%, respectively (see Table 7). The figure Rs.
1,475 billion includes the total budget of the Government of Nepal for FY 2020-21. In Nepal, the fiscal year
starts on Sawan 1 (July 15). The budget of the federal government is announced one and a half months
before the start of the fiscal year and the budget of the provincial government is announced one month
before. The federal government has released a budget of Rs. 1,647 billion for FY 2021-22. There is a
constitutional provision that the budget should be presented in the parliament on Jestha 15 (May 29).
However, with the House of Representatives dissolved and the budget brought about through an ordinance,
constitutional and legal questions have arisen. Similarly, provincial budgets totaled about Rs. 232 billion
for FY 2021-22 when released Asar 1, 2078 (June 15, 2021). The size of provincial budgets have been
reduced due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Due to political uncertainty, some provinces have not been able to
make public the details of their budgets, meaning some information, including the internal revenues of
certain provinces, could not be obtained.

4

Source: a. Central Bureau of Statistics, 2014 b. National Planning Commission, 2020b c. Nepal
Human Development Report, 2020. Note: Figures in parenthesis indicate percentage of the
national total.
In terms of per capita income, Bagmati Province has the highest per capita income level at
USD 1,917. Karnali Province has the lowest per capita income at only USD 597. Similarly, the
Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) shows the highest poverty incidence in Karnali Province
(51%) and Province Two (48%). Bagmati Province accounts one-third (37.2%) of the country's
GDP. Karnali Province contributes the lowest share of GDP (4.1%). In terms of the literacy rate,
Bagmati Province and Province Two rank in the highest and the lowest positions, respectively. In
size of budget, Bagmati Province has the largest figure of Rs 51.43 billion; Sudurpaschim Province
has the smallest, with only Rs. 33.48 billion. In terms of per person budget, Karnali Province
includes the largest at Rs 22.5 thousand, followed by Gandaki and Sudurpaschim Provinces at Rs
14.5 thousand and Rs 13.1 thousand, respectively. On contrary, Province Two and Lumbini
Province include the lowest per person budgets at of Rs 6.2 thousand and Rs 8.1 thousand,
respectively. The federal budget size is Rs. 1,475 billion. In the subnational level government
revenue, fiscal transfers account for the lion’s share of monies coming from the federal government
(see Table 6).
Out of total 753 local level entities, 460 are Rural Municipalities, 276 are Municipalities,
11 are Sub-Metropolitan Cities and 6 are Metropolitan Cities. Province One has the highest number
of local governments (137), followed closely by Province Two (136). At the other extreme, Karnali
Province, despite having the largest geographical area, has only 79 local level entities. Localities
also vary in terms of population; the largest five municipalities account for around 10 percent of
total population. The Kathmandu Metropolitan city (the capital) has the largest population at
975,453 (about 4% of the national population). By contrast, another local government in Nepal

5

has only 538 residents (Narpabhumi Rural Municipality in Manang, a Himalayan district
connected to Tibet). The population structure of local level entities is summarized in Figure 1,
which shows that there are around 50 local levels with population of 10,000 or less. The most
typical population size for a local level entity (205) is in the range of 20-30,000, while there are
only 9 local level units with a population of more than 150,000.

No. of local level entities

Figure 1. Population of Local Level Entities
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In terms of land area, the five most populous local government units account for just around
7 percent of country’s land area. By contrast, the Namkha Rural Municipality alone has 1,420
square kilometers (around 2% of the national area), which makes it 50 times larger than
Kathmandu Metropolitan City. With local level population varying from 538 to around one million
and land area from seven square kilometers to 2,420, Nepal has many different levels of population
density. The land area of local level entities is summarized in Figure 2. There are 8 local level
entities having land areas of 20 square kilometer or less. At the other extreme, there are 86 local
governments with land areas greater than 320 sq. km. However, the most typical land area of local
level entities falls in the range of 110-120 sq. km., representing 86 LG units.
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No. of local level entities

Figure 2. Land Area of Local Level Entities
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In terms of real GDP growth, it exceeded 6 percent in all provinces except Bagmati in FY
2018-19 (Figure 3). However, due to the unfolding COVID-19 pandemic crisis, which has
induced lockdowns and suspension of most economic activities, the economies of all provinces
were adversely affected and economic growth declined heavily in FY 2019-20. The country's
GDP growth was around 7 percent in FY 2018-19 has declined to minus 2.1% in FY 2019-20.
Figure 3. Economic Growth Rate of Provinces (Percentage)
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Source: MOF, 2021a
3. Constitutional and Legal Provisions for the Fiscal Architecture at Subnational
Governments Level
In this paper, the review of the fiscal architecture of subnational levels includes five
aspects: 1) expenditure responsibilities; 2) revenue-raising powers; 3) revenue sharing, including
revenues from natural resources; 4) fiscal transfers; and 5) borrowing (also known as debt). This
7

follows the meaning of the “fiscal architecture” in Bahl (2012). Wallace (2001, p. 2) defines “fiscal
architecture” more broadly to include the “potential impact of the important economic,
demographic and institutional changes on the ability of a government to finance public goods.”
Where relevant, this paper also discusses the impact of socioeconomic and demographic factors
on the ability of Nepal’s subnational governments to discharge their functions.
The constitution assigns key revenue headings to the federal government (Table 3). These
headings include customs duty, excise duty, value added tax, corporate income tax, individual
income tax, tourism fee, passport fee, visa fee, etc. The provinces are provided with nominal
revenue raising rights. These include land registration fee, motor vehicle tax, entertainment tax,
advertisement tax, agricultural income tax, etc. The local level units have powers to raise revenue
from local taxes such as property tax, house rent tax, house land registration fee, vehicle tax,
service charge, tourism fee, advertisement tax, business tax, land tax, entertainment tax, etc.
Table 3. Revenue-Raising Powers of Different Levels of Government
Federal
(1) Custom Duty
(2) Excise Duty
(3) Value Added Tax
(4) Corporate Income Tax
(5) Personal Income Tax
(6) Remuneration Tax

Provincial
(1) House and Land
Registration Fee
(2) Vehicle Tax
(3) Entertainment Tax
(4) Advertisement Tax
(5) Tax on Agricultural
Income

B. NonTax
Revenue

(1) Passport Fee
(2) Visa Fee
(3) Tourism Fee
(4) Service Fee
(5) Gambling/Lottery
(6) Fines and Penalties

(1) Service Fee
(2) Tourism Fee
(3) Fines and Penalties

Local
(1) Property Tax
(2) House Rent Tax
(3) House and Land
Registration Fee
(4) Vehicle Tax
(5) Land Tax (Land Revenue)
(6) Entertainment Tax
(7) Advertisement Tax
(8) Business Tax
(1) Service Fee
(2) Tourism Fee
(3) Fines and Penalty

C. Other
Revenue

(1) Other tax and nontax
raised/levied according to
federal and other prevailing
laws.

(1) Other tax and nontax
raised/levied according to
the provincial law and
other prevailing laws on
the provincial jurisdiction.

(1) Other tax and nontax
raised/levied according to the
local law and other prevailing
laws on the local government
level jurisdiction.

A. Tax
Revenue

Source: Constitution of Nepal, as quoted in the Intergovernmental Fiscal Arrangement Act,
2017.
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Some revenue raising rights at the province and local levels overlap with each other and
with the federal level. The land registration fee, vehicle tax, entertainment tax, and advertisement
tax are on the exclusive taxing rights list of both the provincial and local levels. 9 In fact, the
provinces do not have substantial revenue raising rights reserved only to them, except for the
agricultural income tax. Even this tax has generated only nominal revenue for the provinces. In
FY 2018-19, all seven provinces collected only Rs 32 million total from this revenue heading. In
FY 2020-21, they have projected Rs 145 million from this revenue right (see Figure 7). This
demonstrates another difficulty of the current fiscal architecture: as the provinces have just recently
been formed, they lack full information about their financial statuses and rights. There is no
preparation to estimate the scope of revenue; instead, the provinces have had to start from scratch,
with most of their work being done based on projections.
Nepal's federalism is heavily centralized on the revenue side. To decentralize this
revenue, the Intergovernmental Fiscal Arrangement Act 2017 included a “revenue-sharing”
provision. Per this act, provincial and local governments have a legal entitlement to receive 15
percent each of fiscal resources from value-added taxes (VAT) 10 and excise duties from domestic
production under the heading of “revenue sharing.” The federal government has created a
divisible fund to deposit the amount collected from these headings. Out of total funds collected
in the entire country, the federal government keeps 70 percent of this amount and distributes the

To solve this problem, a single tax administration system has been implemented, in which one level of
government collects and distributes proceeds to the other(s). For example, provincial governments collect
vehicle taxes and share 40% of that revenue to the local government. The provincial and local levels
classify revenue collected from these headings as 'revenue sharing.' However, some local levels have been
found to have not distributed the revenue of these headings to the provinces. Similarly, some provinces
have blocked local level fiscal equalization grants and do not distribute the shared revenue. While the
situation has improved somewhat over time, some provinces still complain that local level governments
have not paid much attention to revenue collection due to this compulsory distribution sharing.
10 Out of total Government of Nepal revenue collections, tax revenues comprise the lion’s share at 87%.
The non-tax headings share a nominal impact, making up only 13% of revenues. Within the tax headings,
the VAT contributes 31% and the excise duty 15% (Devkota, 2017).
9
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remaining 30 percent (15 percent each) to the provincial and local levels by the formula
recommended by the NNRFC. In the formula, 60 percent weight is given to population. The
remaining 40 percent includes geographical area, socioeconomic development indicators, etc.
In the constitution, provisions related to royalties from natural resources are included in
the concurrent revenue list for all three levels of governments. The Intergovernmental Fiscal
Arrangement Act defines the sharing ratio for the divisible pool amount. Accordingly, the
provincial and local governments get 25 percent each of royalties from natural resources including
those from mountaineering, forestry, electricity generation, mining, etc. The NNRFC has
developed a separate formula for the distribution of each of these natural resource headings. The
government distributes them as per the formulae recommended by the NNRFC. Similar to
“revenue sharing,” 11 the federal government has created a separate divisible fund account for these
royalty headings. Revenue collected across the country in the revenue sharing headings (VAT and
excise duty) are shared among all subnational governments. However, the royalties of natural
resources are distributed only to those subnational government units that are located in the
geographic area where these revenues are collected.
Fiscal transfers are an integral part of the fiscal architecture at the subnational levels. In
terms of fiscal transfers, Article 60 of the constitution states that necessary arrangements will be
made to distribute the revenue collected by the Government of Nepal to the federal, provincial,
and local levels. This article also states that the amounts of fiscal transfers will be as per the
recommendation of the NNRFC and the provincial and local levels will receive four types of
grants: fiscal equalization, conditional, special, and matching grants. After the implementation of

Out of total fiscal transfers to the subnational levels, this heading comprises 33.65 percent (see Table 3).
From this heading, the subnational levels can fund administrative expenses including the salary and
allowance of officials.

11
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federalism, provincial and local governments have started receiving all four types of grants. The
National Natural Resources and Fiscal Commission Act, 2017, and the Intergovernmental Fiscal
Arrangement Act, 2017, have been promulgated to enable legal provisions for fiscal transfers.
These Acts specify the definition and distribution criteria of grants and revenue sharing.
In addition to transfers from the federal to provincial and local levels, the constitution
provides for mandatory fiscal transfers from the provincial to the local level as well.
Accordingly, the provinces have started distributing grants to the local level units. Parallel to the
four grant types from the federal level, the local level entities also receive such grants from the
respective provincial governments. 12 Both the federal government and provincial governments
distribute fiscal equalization transfers to their constituent subnational government units based on
formulae and allocations methodology approved by NNRFC. In fiscal transfers, the fiscal
equalization grant has an important place. The constitution states that this grant should be
distributed on the basis of fiscal need and revenue capacity. 13
The Constitution states that only the federal government has the right to take foreign aid
and loans. Such assistance and loans should be taken for the overall economic stability of the
country. Further, the Intergovernmental Fiscal Arrangement Act states that provincial and local
level entities cannot take any kind of foreign grant or assistance without the prior approval of the
federal government.
Article 251 of the Constitution empowers the NNRFC to determine the limits on internal

Provinces started providing fiscal transfers to local governments from their first full budget in FY 201819 and transferred about 10 percent of their total budgets to the local level in FY 2020-21. In general, the
provinces have established good practices in distributing grants to the local level from their own sources.
13 The NNRFC Act 2017 stipulates that transfers made to each provincial and local government from the
federal government, and from provinces to local governments, be made based on several indicators
including human development and multi-dimensional poverty indices, an infrastructure index, area
revenue capacity, area expenditure needs, and so on.
12
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borrowing that can be undertaken by the federal, provincial, and local levels by analyzing
macroeconomic indicators. However, the law stipulates that provincial and local level entities must
obtain the consent of the federal government before taking internal loans. With the approval of the
federal government, the provincial and local levels can take loans from various agencies. Similarly,
the federal government has a legal provision to give loans to the subnational governments. There
is an old entity, the Town Development Fund, 14 for local level borrowing. However, no similar
type of institution(s) have been established for the provinces. Similarly, to date, no province has
taken any loan from the federal government (also see section six).
4. The Federal Level's Revenues and Expenditures
The outbreak of COVID-19 has severely affected most of the economic sectors of the
country including agriculture, industry, electricity, construction, trade, tourism, transportation,
education, health, etc. As pointed out by the Central Bank of Nepal, 61 percent of industrial and
business establishments were completely closed in the outbreak period (NRB, 2020). The National
Planning Commission has estimated that Nepal has lost equivalent of Rs 200 billion (five percent
of GDP) in various sectors of the economy in FY 2019-20 (Acharya, 2020). Due to the outbreak
of COVID-19, the federal government tax revenue declined by 7 percent in FY 2019-20; in FY
2018-19, the revenue had increased by 3.4 percent. Similarly, exports declined by 6.6 percent in
FY 2019-20, where in FY 2018-19 it had increased by 25.3 percent. The tourism sector was badly
affected. The number of tourist arrivals had increased by 2.1 percent in 2019 but declined by 81
percent in 2020. Foreign currency earnings from the tourism sector likewise declined by 70 percent
in 2020 (MOF, 2021a). The outbreak has created many problems, including in poverty alleviation.
Many people have lost their employment. This has seriously affected overall public revenues and
14 It is the only autonomous financial intermediary institution in the country, established by the
Government of Nepal in 1989. It provides debt financing to urban local governments. The federal
government is developing this entity into an infrastructure financing entity for all local level units.
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expenditures of the entire country, including those of the subnational governments. Steps have
been taken to address the crisis. The federal government has paid special attention to supporting
vaccination to prevent Coronavirus. Relief programs have also been introduced for the different
sectors including industry, trade, tourism, etc. However, there are still general grievances that the
government has not been able to do a good job in managing the COVID-19 pandemic.
Federal revenues and expenditures for four fiscal years are summarized in Table 4. FY 2021 and 21-22 are estimated figures. The total revenue of Nepal stood at only Rs 986 billion in FY
2018-19. Due to outbreak of COVID-19, the total revenue in FY 2019-20 declined by around 9
percent. The share of foreign loans and grants in total revenue was 15 percent in FY 2018-19. The
loans share is estimated to be 26 percent in FY 2021-22. Similar to revenues, expenditures are also
lower i.e., only Rs 1,110 billion in FY 2018-19, which declined by 3.24 percent in FY 2019-20.
Compared to recurrent expenditures, the share of capital expenditures is minor (22%) in both FY
2018-19 and 2019-20. Of total expenditures, the share supported with internal revenue was around
67 percent in FY 2018-19 and 68 percent in FY 2019-20.
Table 4. Federal Government Revenues and Expenditures (Rs, billion)
S.N. Particulars
Revenue
Internal revenue
Foreign grant
Foreign loan
Internal loan
Total
B. Expenditure
1 Recurrent
2 Capital
3 Financing (Loan/interest payment)
Total
% of capital exp. in total expenditure
% of internal revenue to expenditure
A.
1
2
3
4

Actual Revised estimate
Estimate
% change 182018-19
2019-20
2020-21 2021-22 19 to 19-20
742
23
124
97
986

727
32
121
19
899

890
61
299
22
1272

1065
65
315
25
1470

-2.02
39.13
-2.42
-80.41
-8.82

716
242
152
1110
21.80
66.85

702
240
132
1074
22.35
67.69

949
353
173
1475
23.93
60.34

1004
492
201
1697
28.99
62.76

-1.96
-0.83
-13.16
-3.24

Source: National Planning Commission, 2020a
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5. Institutional Set-Up of the Fiscal Architecture at the Subnational Government Levels
After the provincial elections held in November and December of 2017, seven provincial
governments came into existence in February 2018. In each province, seven ministries 15 were
created including the Office of Chief Minister and Council of Ministers. Similarly, the office of
the Chief of Province 16 and the Provincial Assembly 17 were established as the legislative organs
in the province.
Province Treasury Controller Offices 18 were created in all the provinces under the
provincial Ministries of Economic Affairs and Planning19 to work in the field of financial
management. The role of this entity in the provinces is similar to that of the Financial Comptroller
General Office 20 in the federal government.
The Business Allocation Rules 2017 21 for the provincial government has set out the roles
and responsibilities of all the provincial ministries and other executive bodies under them. This
was based on the “Unbundling Exercise,” 22 which was an important policy document in detailing
out the constitutional responsibilities for the operation of the provincial governments. Currently,
there are 1,080 institutions at the provincial level, including the ministries, directorates, and

These include: Office of the Chief Minister and Council of Ministers, Ministry for Economic Affairs and
Planning, Ministry for Internal Affairs and Law, Ministry for Physical Infrastructure and Development,
Ministry for Land Management, Agriculture and Co-Operatives, Ministry for Social Development, and
Ministry for Industry, Tourism, Forest, and Environment.
16 The Chief of Province is the highest institution in the hierarchy of provincial governance and is
considered to be a representative of the federal government in the province.
17 There are 550 provincial legislature members in seven provinces. Bagmati and Karnali Provinces
include the largest and the smallest number of provincial parliamentarians at 110 and 40, respectively.
18 It is responsible for operating the province consolidated fund, facilitating the implementation of the
budget, and maintaining accounts of the income and expenditures of the provincial government.
19 Like the Ministry of Finance at the central government, it is the Ministry of Finance of the province.
20 https://www.fcgo.gov.np/
21 The document is concerned with what provincial ministries should do. It specifies the responsibilities of
the ministries. It was prepared by the federal government and sent to the provinces. The foundation of
Nepal's federalism is also based on this document.
22 It is an elaboration of the functional responsibilities in the schedule of the constitution for the three-tier
government. In this exercise, the functional responsibilities were broken down into different subfunctions. Altogether, 1795 functions were identified, in which 870, 565, and 360 belong to the federal,
provincial, and local governments respectively.
15
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various district level offices (Figure 4).
Figure 4. Numbers of Total Institutions at the Province Level
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Source: Office of the Auditor General, 2020.
Article 302 (2) of the Constitution mandates that provincial and local governments adhere
to the management and operations of government services as per federal law. After the adoption
of the Civil Servant Adjustment Act 2017, the existing government employees were reassigned to
the federal, provincial, and local levels. Out of 99,571 civil servants, 39,960 (40.12%) stayed at
the federal level, 13,821 (13.87%) in the provinces, and the rest 43,807 (43.98%) were reassigned
to the local levels (Figure 5). This population of employees has been judged insufficient: the
federal government estimated the need for a total of 138,622 employees across all three tiers of
governments (48,606 federal [35%], 22,297 provincial [16%], and 67,719 local [49%]).
Figure 5: Details of Civil Servants Adjustments
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Source: MOF, 2019b.
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The federal government made these adjustments in the allocation of civil servants, but the
needs of staff at the provinces are different. There is a pressing need for provinces to conduct
their own Organizational and Management surveys, create necessary institutions, and recruit
required personnel on their own terms through the Provincial Public Service Commission.
As of December 2020, provincial governments had enacted 333 laws in total (Figure 6)
including in the areas of security, governance, economic development, social development, and
infrastructure development. Bagmati and Lumbini Provinces have introduced the highest number
(59) of laws each, followed by Province 1 (49) and Gandaki (46). Province 2 and Sudurpaschim
each have enacted 42 laws. Karnali has enacted the lowest number (36) of laws. Some important
laws include: the Finance Procedure Act, Provincial Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfer Act,
Revenue Sharing Act, Administrative Procedure Act, Industrial Investment Act, etc. Law is
needed to run any government. Nepal's provinces have been in existence for less than five years.
Along with the formation of the provinces, the law-making process is also gradually improving.
In theory, laws may vary depending on provincial justification and needs; however, at the time of
writing, the laws of almost all the provinces are the same.
Figure 6. Number of Laws Passed by Provincial Assemblies
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Source: Devkota, Shrestha, and Ghimire (2021).
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Key institutions and legal documents related to fiscal architecture at the subnational
government levels are summarized in Box 1.
The Office of Auditors General (OAG), 2324

Box 1. Key Entities and Legal
Documents Related to Fiscal
Architecture at the Subnational Levels

is auditing the financial details of all tiers of

A. Institutions
• OAG, NNRFC, MOF and FCGO
• Ministry of Economic Affairs and
Planning
• Provincial Policy and Planning
Commission
• Provincial Treasury Controller Office
• Intergovernmental Fiscal Council
B. Legal documents
• Intergovernmental Fiscal
Arrangement Act24
• Provincial Financial Procedure Act25
• Provincial Intergovernmental Fiscal
Transfer Act26
• Local Government Operation Act27

governments. The NNRFC is known as the

Source: Author's compilation, 2021.

National Natural Resources and Fiscal 2526
Commission (NNRFC), Ministry of Finance
(MoF), and Financial Comptroller General
Office (FCGO) comprise the central level
financial institutions. The OAG and the NNRFC
are constitutional bodies. A key role of the OAG

custodian of fiscal federalism. The MOF is the central authority of the Government of Nepal,
charged with the responsibility for fiscal transfers, among others. The Ministries of Economic
Affairs and Planning at the provincial level play similar roles for their governments. The FCGO's
key role is to track the revenues and expenditures at each level of government. It also provides
technical backstopping for the subnational levels. The Provincial Treasury Controller Offices
play the same role at the provinces as FCGO does for the nation. The Provincial Policy and

This act elaborates provisions for revenue raising powers, revenue sharing, grants, external assistance,
and loan arrangements for all three tiers of government. Additionally, it provides mandates for public
financial management and planning of revenues and expenditures, including the development of a
medium-term expenditures framework every year while preparing the annual budget.
24 It makes the provincial financial management system accountable, transparent, and result-oriented by
managing the operation and management of the Provincial Consolidated Fund and other funds, and
contains important provisions related to budget formulation, disbursement and expenditure, accounting
and reporting of financial transactions, internal controls, audits, and other economic activities.
25 This act highlights details of fiscal transfers and management systems from the provincial governments
to the local governments.
26 This act provides overall provisions for local government administration and operation. This includes
provisions on local government jurisdictions, roles and responsibilities, legal committees, etc. that are
necessary for the effective operations of local governments.
23
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Planning Commission is an advisory body for the provincial government responsible for
planning. The Intergovernmental Fiscal Council 27 is a common forum for all the tiers for fiscal
management issues.
6. Analysis of Subnational Revenues and Expenditures
Table 5 summarizes executed revenues and expenditures of subnational governments for
FY 2018-19. The total revenues of provincial and local entities stood at Rs 229 billion and Rs 343
billion, respectively. Within these, the own-source revenues stood at Rs 24.88 billion and Rs 26.73
billion. Similarly, the contribution of fiscal transfers to the provincial and local level entities stood
at Rs.115 billion and Rs. 226 billion. In the fiscal transfer figures of the local governments,
transfers from provinces are also included. The status of expenditures is similar to that of revenues.
Total expenditure stood at Rs 112 billion for provincial governments and Rs 269 billion for local
governments, respectively.
Within the total revenues of the provinces and local governments, the share of own-source
revenue was 10.86 percent and 7.80 percent, respectively. After including revenue sharing, the
ratio rises to 30.31 percent for provinces and 22.03 percent for local governments. 28 Similarly, the
ratio of local government expenditures to GDP (7.78%) is higher than the provincial ratio of 3.24
percent.
The subnational governments’ ability to spend does not keep up with their revenues. The

27 The Intergovernmental Fiscal Arrangement Act, 2017 has the provision for an Intergovernmental Fiscal
Council in the chairmanship of the federal Finance Minister. The Council provides consultation and
coordination in matters related to the management of intergovernmental finances between the federal,
provincial and the local governments.
28 Revenue sharing is the division of tax revenue collected from VAT and excise duties. The federal
government collects and shares this revenue with the subnational governments. The Ministry of Finance
and NNRFC publications have categorized it as a fiscal transfer. However, in the report of the OAG, it has
been included within the classification of subnational governments' revenue. The subnational
governments have also taken it as their own revenue. Since the federal government shares this revenue
with some conditions, there is definitely reason to argue for considering it as a grant, with more
discussion needed to settle this matter.
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most important part is that less than five years have passed since the formation of the local and
provincial governments' level according to the new federal structure. There have been issues in
staffing, law formulation, office set-ups, etc. In fact, the federal government has not sincerely
cooperated in solving problems at the subnational governments' level (Devotka, 2021).
Table 5. Revenue and Expenditure of Subnational Levels (Rs, billion, FY 2018-19)
Revenue and Expenditure
Revenue
Own-source revenues
Revenue sharing 29
Fiscal transfers 30
Cash balance 31
Total
Expenditures
% of own-source revenue to total revenues
% of own-source and shared revenues to total
% of expenditures to general government
expenditures
% of expenditure to national GDP

Rs, Billion
Province Local

Per Person (Rs, 000)
Province
Local

24.88
44.54
115.00
44.58
229.00
112.08
10.86
30.31
10.01

26.73
48.78
225.94
41.25
342.70
269.04
7.80
22.03
24.02

0.94
1.68
4.34
1.68
8.64
4.23

3.24

7.78

1.02
1.86
8.61
1.57
13.06
10.25

Source: Devkota (2020).
Table 5 summarizes the actual revenue and expenditure of the subnational level for the FY
2018-19. Table 6 summarizes budgeted fiscal transfers, including revenue sharing, in FY 2019-20
and 2020-21. The table shows that the subnational governments have around one-third of the
federal budget received in transfers. In terms of GDP, the subnational governments received 12.31
percent in FY 2019-20 and 11.20 percent in FY 2020-21. (The budgeted revenues and expenditures
for the provincial level in FY 2019-20 and 2020-21 are summarized in Table 7.)

Out of the total local government revenue sharing figure of Rs 48.78 billion, around 10.5 percent
includes vehicles tax revenue sharing from the province.
30 In case of local transfers, transfers from the province to the locality is also included. Out of total local
figure of Rs 225.94 billion, province shares include around 7 percent.
31 The budget/resources not spent last year is called “cash balance.” This includes fiscal equalization grant,
internal revenue, and revenue sharing movies. Other grant types return to the granting body.
29
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Table 6. Fiscal Transfers (Budgeted): Vertical Shares (Rs, billion)
Fiscal equalization grant
Conditional grant
Special grant
Matching grant
Revenue sharing
Total
Percent of federal budget
Percent of GDP

Provincial
2019-20
55.3
44.55
5
5
65
175
11.41
4.64

2020-21
55.19
36.35
3.14
5.19
61.07
161
10.92
3.72

Local
2019-20
89.95
124
5
5
65
289
18.86
7.67

2020-21
90.5
161
6.83
4.78
61.07
324
21.99
7.48

Subnational Total 32
2019-20 2020-21
145.25
145.69
168.55
197.35
10
9.97
10
9.97
130
122.14
464
485
30.27
32.91
12.31
11.20

Source: Devkota (2020)
The provinces formulated their first full annual budgets in FY 2018-19. The actual revenue
of the provinces for that year was Rs 229 billion. In FY 2019-20 and 2020-21, the provinces
adopted annual budgets of Rs 260 billion and 264 billion, respectively (Table 7). In total, the share
of own source revenue (OSR) in the provincial budgets was 11 percent in FY 2019-20 and 14
percent in FY 2020-21. This share of 11% to 14% from OSR and another 25% from guaranteed
revenue sharing is not trivial by developing country standards, especially when the ability of the
newly created subnational governments to design, enforce, and administrate taxes remains highly
questionable.
However, whatever rights the provinces were given overlap with that of the local level
units. The provinces’ only truly own tax revenue source is the agricultural income tax, which is
only a nominal source, as they have not been able to tap this heading. The provinces collected only
Rs 32 million from this heading in FY 2018-19 (see Figure 7), compared to Rs 25 billion in total
own-source revenues. Figure 7 also includes projected revenues for the FY 2019-20 and FY 202021. Neither Karnali nor Sudurpaschim Provinces collected or expect to collect any revenue from
The numerical figure of fiscal transfer including revenue sharing in the budget presented by the federal
government from the ordinance for the fiscal year 2021-22 is Rs. 509 billion. Which is about 31 percent of
the total federal budget. The percentage ratio has been decreased of about two percent compared to FY
2020-21. According to the constitution, the budget cannot be presented from the ordinance. It should be
presented in the Parliament. As the validity of the budget is also being debated in Nepal now, other
aspects of FY 2021-22 budget are not discussed here.
32
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the agricultural income tax. In FY 2020-21, the total projected revenue from this heading is
expected to be only Rs 145 million. While it is true that the provinces do not have sufficient
revenue-raising powers in law, it is also a problem that they do not make good use of their existing
own revenue sources. Until they can exercise the revenue-raising powers given to them with
sincerity, it will be difficult to secure additional powers.
Figure 7. Revenue from Agricultural Income Tax (Rs, 000)
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Source: Provincial governments budget speech documents, FY 2020-21
Fiscal transfers (excluding revenue sharing) contribute to 45 percent and 38 percent of
the budgeted expenditures in FY 2019-20 and 2020-21 respectively. Out of seven provinces,
three provinces have also budgeted loan figures. However, the share of their loans is nominal. It
is unfortunate that the share of cash balance seems somewhat higher, at 17 percent in FY 201920 and 22 percent in FY 2020-21. There is a growing tendency to keep fiscal transfer figures as a
cash balance for the next year without spending them. This is an accusation leveled by the
federal government to the subnational governments' level. 33 It is important to increase the

The annual and half-yearly review reports of the Ministry of Finance have information in this regard.
There are news reports and articles in various daily newspapers as well.
33
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spending capacity at the subnational governments' level.
Table 7. Revenue and Expenditure (Budgeted) of Provincial Level (Rs, billion)
FY
19-20
OSR
20-21
19-20
Revenue
sharing
20-21
19-20
Fiscal
transfers
20-21
19-20
Loan
20-21
19-20
Cash
balance
20-21
Budgeted 19-20
expenditure 20-21

Sudhur
% budget
One Two Bagmati Gandaki Lumbini Karnali paschim Total
exp. 34
4.12 3.13
12.2
3.69
4.9
0.3
0.84 29.18
11.24
5.25 2.72
19.35
4.91
4.97
0.32
0.7 38.22
14.47
10.27 10.42
10.6
7.7
9.9
7.44
8.04 64.37
24.80
9.54 9.52
9.7
7.57
9.47
7.4
7.87 61.07
23.12
21.2 16.17
18.05
13.96
16.61 16.92
14.5 117.41
45.23
15.11 13.41
14.87
13.36
14.07 14.83
14.21 99.86
37.80
0
1.3
0
1.98
0
0.75
0
4.03
1.55
5
1
0
2
0
0
0
8
3.03
6.61 7.7
6.75
4.8
5
8.94
4.78 44.58
17.17
6 6.91
7.5
7
7.85 11.19
10.59 57.04
21.59
42.2 38.72
47.6
32.13
36.41 34.35
28.16 259.57
100
40.9 33.56
51.43 34.84
36.35 33.74
33.38 264.2
100

Source: Author's analysis based on provincial governments' budget speeches documents of FY
2019-20 and FY 2020-21.
The fiscal dependence ratios of the provinces in FY 2019-20 and FY 2020-21 are presented
in Figure 8, which shows that the provinces are highly dependent on revenue sources that are
beyond their control. The average provincial fiscal dependence ratio 35 is 0.78 for FY 2019-20.
Among the provinces, Karnali Province, Sudurpaschim Province, and Province Two are most
fiscally dependent on external revenue sources, while Bagmati Province has more fiscal means in
its own hands. The fiscal dependence ratios are even higher for local governments (based on the
data set summarized in Table 5), with an average of 0.92 in FY 2019-20. The ratios suggest that
both the provincial and local level entities may wish to work harder on generating more internal
revenue, particularly the local level.

On June 15, 2021, the provinces presented their Rs 232 billion collective budget for the FY 2021-22.
Some provinces have not released detailed figures yet. As per telephonic conversation with officials of all
seven provinces, the total budget of Rs 232 billion is divided as follows: 39.71% for grants and fiscal
transfers (fiscal equalization, conditional, special, and matching grants), 23.49% revenue sharing
(division of VAT and excise duty), 17.87 % internal revenue, 17.87% cash balance, and the remaining 1.15%
internal loans. As this is based on preliminary figures, there may be slight revisions when final budget
details are released.
35 Here, the fiscal dependence ratio is defined as one minus the ratio of own source revenue to total
expenditure.
34
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Figure 8. Fiscal Dependence Ratios of Provinces (FY 2019-20 & FY 2020-21)
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Source: Author's derivation based on data table 5.
7.

Main Issues and Challenges
In the first five years of the federal system and the provincial governments it created, there

have been both fiscal challenges and successes. This section describes the challenges still facing
local and provincial governments as Nepal’s new federal system continues to mature.
Institutional ambiguity, legislative delays, and inadequate cooperation of the federal
government
Institutional ambiguity and legislative delays have been a major factor in the failure of
Nepal’s fiscal federalism system to function properly as expected at the subnational government
levels. The creation and election of officials to subnational governments before federal elections
were held confused and delayed many necessary legislative processes, as subnational
governments’ laws often had to be based on or informed by federal laws that had not yet been
completed. Further post-election legislative delays at the federal level and inadequate cooperation
by the federal government further aggravated this problem. For example, it took about two years
to reassign civil servants to the newly created provincial and local governments. To date, the
Federal Civil Service Act, which is necessary for legislating provincial and local level civil service
laws, has not been enacted after being stalled in the federal parliament for more than two years.
Although the Provincial Public Service Commissions have been formed, they have not been able
to function properly without the enabling federal laws. Similarly, the Federal Education Act,
23

Health Act, etc. have not been enacted yet. These missing national laws create ambiguities in the
devolution of public functions across the three tiers of government, despite the specification of
powers by the constitution and the actual implementation of the fiscal federalism reforms.
Limited fiscal space at subnational levels
The own-source revenue rights of the subnational governments, especially for the
provinces, are highly limited. Most of the revenue rights assigned to provincial governments
overlap with those of local governments, such as the vehicle tax, land registration fees,
entertainment tax, advertisement tax, etc. Due to the lack of revenue-raising authority, provinces
are forced to depend on federal fiscal transfers and revenue sharing, which currently account for
more than two-thirds of their total revenues. The provinces' only truly own-source tax revenue is
from the agricultural income tax, which remains nominal to date (see Figure 7 above).
The condition of revenue collection
By the constitution, the revenue rights of local governments include the property tax, house
rent tax, business tax, advertisement tax, service fees, etc. Despite possessing authority for most
of the subnational revenue handles, local governments have not paid much attention to revenue
mobilization. The share of own-source revenue in their total revenue pool is only about 8 percent
(see Table 5 above). Even if revenue-sharing is also included, this ratio rises to just 22.03 percent.
Compared to the taxing powers now controlled by local governments, their revenue efforts have
been far from reaching their potential.
To the extent relevant, a similar problem is seen in the provinces as well. Though provinces
have far fewer revenue-collecting rights, they have not maximized the activation of the rights they
do hold. The largest components of the province’s own-source revenues are the vehicle tax and
house and registration fees. Provinces can also collect revenues from entertainment and
24

advertisement taxes, fines, tourism fee, and income from sale of services and goods, etc. Even with
these rights, provincial own-source revenues remain small.
Issues with fiscal transfers
Although subnational governments receive the lion’s share of their revenues from federal
fiscal transfers, the related policies and management of these transfers are still plagued with
problems. For example, conditional grants to subnational governments account for 41 percent of
total federal to subnational fiscal transfers in FY 2020-21 (see Table 6 above). However, the
programs and projects of this grant are very small, with dozens of programs and projects with a
cost of less than Rs 100,000 each. In FY 2020-21, the provinces received conditional grant funds
amounting to Rs 36.35 billion for a total of 13,256 programs and projects. The local governments
received Rs 161 billion in conditional grants for 84,000 programs and projects. The small average
size of these programs and projects indicate that the federal government is more likely to send
numerous petty programs and projects to subnational governments, which are more burdensome
to manage, rather than send a large pool of revenue the receiving government can use as it sees fit.
Not only should the federal government increase the size of these fiscal transfers to resolve this
issue, but it should also work to reduce the haphazard nature of conditional grant allocation.
Lack of laws and market mechanism for subnational public borrowing
Although provincial and local governments are allowed to borrow under the limit of up to
12 percent of their total revenues from own sources and revenue sharing, few have actually
leveraged these means of resource mobilization. Province One, Gandaki, and Karnali Provinces
presented deficit budgets to mobilize additional resource through internal loans from the federal
government and internal market in FY 2019-20. However, these provinces have not been able to
do so due to the lack of regulatory basis for the financial market mechanisms including
mechanisms for the issuance of debentures. The federal government to date is yet to provide such
25

legal provisions.
Disappointing performances
Despite the challenges, a primary institutional framework necessary for fiscal federalism
has been formed and the necessary laws governing the functioning of subnational governments
have been enacted. In case of local governments, the Local Governments Operation Act was
enacted in 2017. The act provides many opportunities for local initiatives on both the revenue
mobilization and public expenditure fronts. Similarly, the required minimum staff is also present
at the local level. There is no problem of fiscal resources, but some people have complained (in
local publications) that they are not performing well and local level governments are not serious
about providing effective and quality services to the local people.
There is also a high level of dissatisfaction with the provinces, to the point of some calls
for provinces to be scrapped. 36 Some claim that provincial officials pay more attention to
increasing administrative expenses such as salaries, allowances, and enjoyment of vehicle facilities
than to their duties. 37 Additional claims hold that development work is not being done on a needbased basis and officials paying attention only to their constituency. 38 Due to these reasons, citizens
are not satisfied with the subnational government levels, particularly the provinces. These
36 Public complaints have included comments such as [paraphrased] 'The country was taken to federalism
without serious discussion. It is not a good system of governance. It must be scrapped.' Civil society and
journalists have expressed negative opinions about federalism and some political parties have begun
lobbying against it, asserting that federalism is not necessary.
37 This is the mostly commonly expressed grievance of the people towards the provinces. At present, the
number of institutional structures, including offices, is increasing in the province. Of course, creating a
new structure increases administrative costs in the beginning, but some provinces have unnecessarily
increased the number of ministries, appointed more political appointments, and raised the number of
district levels offices, changing the way people look at the province.

There are widespread criticisms that almost all the provinces have budgeted funds in the name of a
'Constituency Development Fund,' meaning that planning is done by looking to the Members of
Parliaments. Such programs and projects are taken out of their pocket rather than following a participatory
planning process. Similarly, the budget was not allocated proportionately in all the local levels within the
province. There are complaints that the Chief Ministers and Ministers of the provinces focused only on their
constituencies and did not allocate budget on the basis of infrastructure development and poverty mapping.
38
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subnational level entities should take the voice of the people seriously and put their act together to
create a better performance to meet the rising expectation of the people.

Outbreak of COVID-19
The outbreak of COVID-19 has also emerged as a major problem for subnational
governments. It has affected all economic sectors and the GDP growth rates of the provinces. The
first and second years of the establishment of the subnational government levels were spent on
institutional structures and law making. Just as they started to have enough experience to progress,
COVID-19 appeared. The budget could not be spent as expected due to this pandemic, as it caused
problems with internal revenue collection as well as mandating a shift in focus to pandemic
management, disrupting development work. Due to this pandemic, significant problems have
emerged in the social, economic, infrastructure, tourism, development, and other areas of
subnational governments. In fact, the pandemic problem arose right at the time when the fiscal
structure of the subnational levels was first being strengthened, creating problems in the overall
fiscal architecture system of the subnational levels of government.
8. Conclusion and The Way Forward
After the promulgation of the constitution, the state structure of Nepal underwent
transformative changes to comply with the new federal system of governance. The state power of
the former unitary system was divided across three tiers of governments. Accordingly, the
provincial and local governments have had new functions in this federal set-up, with the provincial
level of government being entirely new. The constitution lists exclusive and concurrent rights for
the three levels of government. These rights were elaborated through an unbundling exercise
carried out to resolve possible disputes between the federal units. Based on this unbundling
exercise, the division of work responsibilities among the council of ministers of the federal and
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provincial governments (Allocation of Business Rules), the Intergovernmental Fiscal Arrangement
Act 2017, and the Local Government Operation Act 2017 have been prepared. This exercise has
laid the foundation for the implementation of federalism in Nepal.
The subnational governments (local and province levels) have begun setting up new
structures, bringing with it a need for new offices to carry out their constitutional responsibilities.
No matter how many nominal rights the subnational governments have, they need offices, staff,
and the legal basis and fiscal resources to actually perform their work. Administrative expenses
increase in proportion to institutional structure. According to the constitution, many functional
responsibilities have been devolved to the subnational governments. As responsibilities shift to the
subnational levels, so do institutional structures. In theory, as federal responsibilities are reduced,
so too are its structures and staff count, while subnational government institutional structures and
staffing need to be strengthened. However, structures at the federal level have not been reduced.
Instead, additional institutional structures have been set up in the name of various projects in
parallel with the jurisdiction of the subnational levels of government, undermining the
effectiveness of the move to a decentralized system.
Nepal's federalism is based on the principle of cooperation and coexistence. By
coordinating with the federal government, the subnational levels of government can also provide
services from some of the federal government offices. For these duties, it is not necessary to open
offices parallel to the offices of the federal government. For example, there are District Treasury
Controller Offices of the federal government in each district and they can provide support to the
provinces. Thus, it is not necessary for the provinces to open such offices in the districts again. Yet
some provinces have opened such offices in the districts. It is important to work in a coordinated
manner, including in building organizational structures.
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In order to make the constitution more functional, necessary laws have to be formulated at
the earliest opportunity. Some laws have to be adopted by the federal level. The subnational
governments are supposed to adopt many of their laws based on the laws of the federal level.
However, due to the absence of federal laws such as the Federal Civil Service Act, the Federal
Education Act, and the Health Act, subnational governments have not been able to draft their own
laws on the respective subjects. Similarly, the federal government has not enacted laws related to
concurrent rights. Due to such policy ambiguity at the federal level, subnational governments have
not been able to function smoothly. The federal government needs to make laws as soon as possible
so that subnational governments' problems are resolved.
The constitution provides many functional responsibilities to the provinces. To fulfill these
functional responsibilities, speed up service delivery, and build a government accountable to the
people, they need sufficient fiscal resources. However, the constitution provides limited revenueraising powers to the provinces. As per the finance follows the functions principle, initiatives are
needed to review the revenue rights of the provinces. This requires paying special attention to their
stakeholders.
Another problem is that subnational governments have not been serious in utilizing the
revenue-raising powers assigned to them. The fiscal dependence ratios of subnational government
are high. The provinces and local governments should work harder on own-source revenue
mobilization. The federal government also needs to create the necessary environment for this. The
subnational governments need support in areas such as managing staff, drafting legislation,
developing institutional structures, etc.
The citizens have started to benefit from the local and provincial governments through the
services they provide and programs they execute. With a few exceptions, there are signs of
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improvement in almost all areas. A sense of positive competition has been created between
different local and provincial governments. Thoughts have been developed on how to strengthen
financial means and resources, how to achieve maximum development with limited means and
resources, and how to provide services to the citizens in a comfortable and easy way. People have
conveniently found the government at their doorsteps to a much greater extent than under the
previous, unitary system. However, despite these achievements, there is dissatisfaction among the
citizens. The performance of federal, provincial, and local governments has not been up to the
expectations and aspirations of the people. Governments at all three tiers need to seriously review
their work and attitudes to meet the rising expectations of the people towards fulfilling their
constitutional rights and obligations in accordance with the nascent federal system.
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